Tuesday, August 01, 2006
Urgent Message--a Must Read for All
I received this message yesterday from my friend Jan Coleman, whom I trust and highly respect. I agree with Jan that this is MUST READ alert. It is so disturbing that I hesitated even to put it up. In some respects, it is even more alarming than the rest of the world news coming forth at this time. Her message is directed at the residents of the Bay area, but also it involves other sites around the country--such as Maryland and Boston, where the government is preparing to install secret labs to develop chemical/biological agents through the use of animal experiments. If leaks should occur (don't they always?) then the lives of hundreds or even thousands may be at risk. The claim is that these are for "defensive purposes" only, but we all know how little credibility such claims have in the light of past events.
THIS IS A NATIONAL ISSUE, A SURVIVAL ISSUE FOR US ALL.
Though this information is extremely disturbing, I think we must be strong enough to face the truth of what is happening right now, and do what we can to stop it. We should also take care to keep ourselves in the best shape to deal with such issues. I suggest the following:
Keep as healthy as you can. Don't become part of the problem (of keeping the world safe). Good health makes it easier to deal with depresssing issues.
Keep in touch with your friends. You will find comfort and support from others who are also willing to know the truth, however disturbing.
Act in the best way for you. If you are willing, contact your representatives in congress and your fellow citizens. These issues concern us all, on many counts. Do the things that Jan suggests above.
Do things to keep your spirits up--give yourself permission to enjoy whatever give you a "lift."
Don't turn away in denial.
If you can and want to contribute money to this cause (now carried by a handful of folks), here is how:
Contributions can be made online at www.trivalleycares.org or by mail to Tri-Valley CAREs, 2582 Old First Street, Livermore, CA 94551. It is a 501c3
Here is her message:
From: "Jan Coleman" View Contact Details Add Mobile Alert
Yahoo! DomainKeys has confirmed that this message was sent by mindspring.com. Learn more
To: "Jan Coleman"
Subject: URGENT MESSAGE FOR BAY AREA RESIDENTS--ACTION NEEDED IMMEDIATELY!!
Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2006 00:43:09 -0700
Friends in the Bay Area:
This may be the most important email message I have ever sent to you—so please take time to read the following:
The Defense Dept and Homeland Security for “national security purposes” have designated Livermore Labs in the East Bay for a secret bio-defense lab, a facility in which they will test (on animals) forms of biological and chemical agents that could be used by terrorists. The agents will be aerosolized and, should they become airborne outside the facility, “they could kill hundreds to thousands of Bay Area residents within a 50-mile radius of the lab (including San Francisco and San Jose)”, say the experts. The structure is on a fault line—and would be a possible target for anyone who would like to do harm to the US.
The required public safety and environmental studies were not done and the matter is in the 13th District Court—but the decision for them to proceed could go either way. I am alarmed that I have not been able to find others in the area that know about this. I made contact with the lawyer handling the case and learned that BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN NO PUBLIC OUTCRY, Tracy, CA, is on a short list for a large acreage to be turned into a testing site for large animals—another “PLUM ISLAND” IN OUR BACKYARD!!
Timing is crucial now! We must speak out and get all politicians, mayors and city councils, environmental groups, animal rights organizations, local and national organizations to stand and be counted—we must create a PUBLIC OUTCRY! The small office in Livermore that is trying to fight the issue needs our help—they have only a couple staff people and are grossly underfunded for such an effort.
I am writing to ask your support in whatever way you can give it. I don’t know how I can take on one more thing right now, but realize I have been having sleepless nights and must SPEAK OUT! I will be happy to play contact point as we begin but am asking you to step forward and help create a team of leaders around this issue. Here are some ways to assist:
Put the word out wherever you can—to your local officials, media, organizations to which you belong locally and nationally.
Let me know what you are willing to do so I can pass on the info to leaders as they emerge.
Put email “chains” in place so when material is sent to you, you can pass it down the chain.
Learn the facts of the issue—I have attached a “fact sheet” from the Livermore office and the link to an informed article in yesterday’s Washington Post which tells about another secret lab being constructed in Maryland and shows a brief video with more info:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/29/AR2006072900592.html?referrer=email
I was told that these bio-defense labs are being sited in several places in the US, including a low-income neighborhood in Boston!
If you don’t live in the Bay Area, you may wish to find out if a secret bio-defense lab is scheduled for your area. And please reach out to anyone you may know in the Bay Area—or organizations/individuals may be of help to us.
A question has been raised as to the suitability of the staff at Livermore for handling this type of testing as they are nuclear scientists, not geneticists.
Thank you for your attention to this matter. I wish it were better news. Many have asked how they can “do something” to change many of the decisions being made on our behalf in this country. Here is one way—start right in our own neighborhood!
Respectfully,
Jan
_____________________________________________________________________
Jan Coleman
415-331-6633
jancoleman@mindspring.com
"If the success or failure of this planet, of human beings,
depended on how I am and what I do,
How would I be? What would I do?"
-- R. Buckminster Fuller
Attachments Attachment scanning provided by:
Files:
Livermore_Bio_Defense_Lab_Bio_FactSheet.doc (42k) [Preview] Scan and Save to Computer - Save to Yahoo! Briefcase
Livermore_Bio_Defense_Lab___McKinzieDeclaration.pdf_2.pdf (468k) Scan and Save to Computer - Save to Yahoo! Briefcase
Now here are the fact sheets which she attached to her original message:
Basic Facts about Livermore Lab’s Bio-warfare Agent Facility
The Department of Energy’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has ordered a 1500 square foot prefabricated building that will house a high-level Bio-Warfare Agent Laboratory inside LLNL. Up to 100 Liters of bio-agents will be used there at any one time. Researchers will aerosolize and genetically modify agents such as plague, anthrax, botulism and rabbit fever. This is a historic decision because these types of high-level agent experiments have never before been located inside a nuclear weapons research laboratory.
Where will it be located? It will be located in the heart of Livermore Laboratory – a 1.3 square mile facility with nearly 10,000 on-site workers, and residential housing developments built right up to the fence line of the Livermore Lab. The Department of Energy considers a 50 miles radius around the lab as the “affected environment” for releases and impacts. This area encompasses the cities of San Jose and San Francisco.
What Agents will the lab experiment on? The lab is a Bio-safety Level 3 (BSL-3) lab, housing a level three select agents lab (level 4 is the highest and is reserved for Bio-Agents with no preventative treatment or known cure). Agents in a BSL-3 are known to cause serious or potentially lethal disease as a result of inhalation. This lab can use any select agents – select agents are organisms that “have historically been associated with weaponizing efforts”.
What Types of Experiments are planned? Experiments will genetically modify these agents and aerosolize them (spray them) onto testing animals inside of special cabinets. The risks posed by genetically modified pathogens have never undergone a broad independent assessment. The lab will infect a maximum of 100 animals at a time, consisting of mainly mice with some rats and guinea pigs. Scientists and policy makers are concerned that genetic modifications could accidentally or intentionally create super-strains that have no known treatment or cure ultimately resulting in bio-weapons of the future. The environmental study conducted by the lab did not include any information about the nature of the genetic modification that DOE plans to conduct or how the lab will manage the hazards inherent in this work.
· Hazards of Genetic Modification: In Sept, 2003 UC Berkeley researchers admitted that they had accidentally created a super-strain of tuberculosis (TB) through genetic modification of ordinary TB that multiplied faster and was more lethal. US government studies have also led to the creation of extremely deadly forms of mousepox, rabbitpox and cowpox. The mousepox is impervious to anti-viral drugs and vaccines.
· Hazards of Aerosolization: Aerosolization of select agents is potentially a form of weaponizing them. A gaseous suspension of fine particles resulting from aerosolization makes these agents far more dangerous due to accidental occupational exposure and, in the case of failure of containment, exposure of civilians outside of the facility.
· Civilian Science: Livermore Lab heralds its “bio-defense” work as key to US defenses against a biological attack. Tri-Valley CAREs does not oppose experiments needed to create bio-detectors or legitimate bio-defense work. Tri-Valley CAREs opposes having this work located inside a super-secret classified nuclear weapons laboratory.
· Lack of Independent Oversight: No independent regulatory agency is responsible for safety at LLNL on a continuing basis. Safety is a matter of self-regulation. This type of management hasn’t worked at other federal labs where the anthrax used in the letters to the media and government officials was most likely derived.
· Dual-Use Nature of this Research: The bio-warfare agent research at Livermore Lab is inherently dual-use. Although DOE states that this lab is purely defensive – there always remains a chance that they could be used for offensive weapons research. The “defensive research” at LLNL will be virtually indistinguishable from “offensive research”. With the secrecy of the program, the US aversion to inspection or verification protocols at the Biological Weapons Convention, the opaque nature of the Institutional Biosafety Committee, and with the lack of independent transparent oversight, no one will know for sure what type of research will be conducted there.
Bad Public Process: The Department of Energy approved this new BSL-3 lab without any public hearings or a thorough environmental review. Many community members appealed to the lab and to the Livermore City Council for public hearings without result. Many unstudied environmental hazards would have been analyzed in a comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement. Further, labs like this one are opening all over the country as congress passed billions for bio-defense without any coordinated plan. Thousands of new employees will be trained to work in these labs making it difficult to prevent theft of information and bio-agents.
· Tri-Valley CAREs filed suit to challenge the legality of the Energy Department’s decision not to conduct a full Environmental Impact Statement. Although the court agreed that many of our arguments were persuasive, the court ruled in favor of the government citing the significant discretion given to government agencies in the law. We are appealing this decision.
Environmental Dangers? LLNL is currently on the EPA’s list of most contaminated sites in the U.S.
· HEPA air filters: The Lab will rely upon HEPA filters to prevent environmental release of deadly bio-agents. LLNL retired physicist Marion Fulk argues that HEPA filters become ineffective when wet or torn and routinely allow some particles to escape.
· Seismic Concerns: The lab sits within one kilometer of the Las Positas and Greenville faults. An earthquake in 1980 injured 44 people and cost the lab many millions in structural damages. Today, 108 buildings have potential seismic problems, 22 have unacceptable risks and 41 wait for detailed evaluation, including buildings where genetic modification will be conducted.
· History of Accidents / Spills: Although LLNL boasts its perfect record of no recorded infections by lab workers, our investigations found that they had several mishaps in the past with their lower level, less-infectious agents where employees poked themselves with needles and possibly threw anthrax contaminated waste out with the general trash.
o CDC does not formally track lab-acquired infections and all infections are voluntarily reported. As a result, we have no accurate information about infections, releases and accidents. Infections often go under-reported because lab directors fear reprisal and because journals only publish infections that are new, rare or unusual.
· Transportation Dangers: Shipments will travel by FedEx or other commercial courier service. LLNL estimates 60 shipments (in and out) per month.
o Incidents Elsewhere: On October 6, 2004 – a package containing 5 tubes of TB was stolen in Barcelona, Spain. In June of 2004, Oakland Children’s Hospital called in the FBI after they found purportedly attenuated anthrax shipments to be live and dangerous.
Proliferation Threats: Over the last decade or more, the US has demonstrated that it values the secrecy of its commercial and military facilities more highly than the transparency that is needed for effective international monitoring of compliance with the requirements of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Collocation of nuclear and biological warfare agent research at Livermore Lab could lead other countries to follow-suit causing nearly insurmountable verification problems. Identifying whether a bio-lab is conducting offensive research is generally a matter of intent of the researcher since many of the experiments are the same whether they be for peaceful purposes or for developing a biological weapons program.
· Tri-Valley CAREs believes that bio-warfare agent research should be conducted under the auspices of civilian science centers and not inside classified nuclear weapons laboratories with strengthened oversight and reporting requirements. Tri-Valley CAREs attended the BWC meeting in December of 2004.
Institutional Biosafety Committees: Keepers of the BWC ? LLNL claims that its IBC will review all projects involving high-level bio-agents to ensure that experiments comply with international prohibitions against development of bio-weapons and with all other health and safety laws.
o The National Institute of Health requires IBC’s to make minutes available to the public and recommends that they hold open meetings. LLNL’s IBC has refused to release redacted minutes for at least seven months after the meeting is held. Numerous requests by Tri-Valley CAREs to attend IBC meetings or even be alerted when they are held have been plainly denied.
o Community Members: The lab claims to include “community members” on the IBC, however, such members’ names and background information were redacted. According to a study of IBCs, Livemore Lab stands alone in redacting this info.
Take Action!
o Send money – we need to raise $15,000 to support our appeal.
o Write letters to editor
o Speak out at City Council meetings – local club meetings
o Demand that the IBC meetings be open to the public and transparent and have a seat for a true member of the public.
o Read Tri-Valley CAREs newsletter for updates and contact our office to get involved.
(Here is the "McKinzie Brief," the case now being presented in court that Jan refers to above. The blank spaces are where diagrams and drawings appear in the original document. If you are interested, e-mail me and I will send you the attachments which contain these images. My address is dorothywalters2@sbcglobal.net)
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
STEPHAN C. VOLKER (CSB #63093)
HEATHER A. DAGEN (CSB #217837)
GRETCHEN E. DENT (CSB #222184)
LAW OFFICES OF STEPHAN C. VOLKER
436 14th Street, Suite 1300
Oakland, California 94612
Telephone: 510/496-0600
Facsimile: 510/496-1366
ALLETTA BELIN, ESQ.
BELIN & SUGARMAN
618 Paseo de Peralta
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501
Telephone: 505/983-8936
Facsimile: 505/983-0036
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
TRI-VALLEY CARES, NUCLEAR
WATCH OF NEW MEXICO, MARYLIA KELLEY,
JANIS KATE TURNER, TARA DORABJI,
HENRY C. FINNEY and CATHERINE SULLIVAN
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
TRI-VALLEY CAREs, NUCLEAR WATCH
OF NEW MEXICO, MARYLIA KELLEY,
JANIS KATE TURNER, TARA DORABJI,
HENRY C. FINNEY and CATHERINE
SULLIVAN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY, NATIONAL NUCLEAR
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL
LABORATORY, and LOS ALAMOS
NATIONAL LABORATORY,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA
DECLARATION OF
MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
I, MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE, declare as follows:
1. I am a scientist for the Nuclear Program of the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC). I have been in this position since 1997. I received my doctorate in physics in 1995
from the University of Pennsylvania, specializing in experimental nuclear physics, and
subsequently held an appointment as a Postdoctoral Associate at the Mario Einaudi Center for
International Studies at Cornell University. I have worked professionally on the topic of
Weapons of Mass Destruction as a scientist and analyst at Cornell and the NRDC for eight
years. My research has been published in NRDC and Cornell research reports and a peerreviewed
technical journal, and I have lectured widely in University and U.S. government
settings. I have been interviewed on numerous occasions as an expert on Weapons of Mass
Destruction on national television and in the print media. My research has included the use of
computer models, satellite imagery and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to simulate the
consequences of the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. A copy of my curriculum vitae is
attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
2. In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks there has been an increased use within
the U.S. Government of computer models designed to calculate the dispersal of chemical,
biological or radiological agents. One computer model that currently has widespread use in the
U.S. military and emergency first-responder communities is HPAC, which stands for Hazard
Prediction and Assessment Capability. HPAC was developed to accurately predict the effects of
hazardous material releases into the atmosphere and calculate the corresponding impacts on
civilian and military populations. The HPAC software is distributed by the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA), an agency of the U.S. Department of Defense. The NRDC is a
licensed user of HPAC.
3. The HPAC software includes a computer model that calculates the mass of biological
agent expelled from a damaged biological weapons storage or production facility: the Biological
FACilities (BFAC) source term model. This damage is presumed to involve an explosion in the
interior of the facility that may be caused by, for example, an accident, an attack, or an external
event such as an earthquake (which is a predictable concern for the Livermore, California area).
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
If there is limited knowledge about the interior of the biological weapons facility, the BFAC
model contains a Facility Category Damage Sub-model in which only the biological agent type,
total mass of agent and a level of damage to the facility (light, moderate, severe or total) needs
to be specified as input to the computer program. According to the HPAC documentation
(HPAC Version 3.2.1), this sub-model then yields conservative estimates of material released
based on the understandings of experts in the associated technical fields. No viability
degradation of the biological agent is assumed in this type of calculation. It should be noted that
at least one of the agents that will be stored and handled at the Biological Safety Level 3 (BSL-
3) facility proposed to be located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL, or the
Lab ), Coxiella burnetii (Q fever), has a strong capability of surviving in the open environment
(LLNL BSL-3 Environmental Assessment, p. 51). Historical wind data provided in associated
HPAC databases may be used to calculate the transport of released biological agent away from
the damaged facility. Alternatively, fixed wind parameters including wind speed and direction
may be directly inputted into HPAC for the calculation.
4. The LLNL is located at 37o 41 North and 121o 42 West in Alameda County
approximately 40 miles east of San Francisco. According to the 2000 U.S. census data analyzed
by census blocks in the vicinity of the Lab, approximately 2,100 people live within one mile of
LLNL, 69,000 people within 5 miles, 123,000 people within 10 miles and 7.2 million people
live within 50 miles of the Lab. Just how far a biological agent would be dispersed in a
hypothetical incident at LLNL would depend on the severity of damage to the facility (and thus
the amount of viable biological agent released) and the speed and direction of the prevailing
winds. The number of initial infections would depend on the type of agent, how widely the
agent was dispersed at varying concentrations and the precise number of exposed persons. The
total number of infections caused by such an incident could be greater than the number of
initially infected persons, however, when potential infections from subsequent contagion are
also factored in.
5. In this declaration, I illustrate several calculations of the release of Anthrax from
postulated incidents at LLNL using the HPAC computer model. Anthrax is one of several
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
biological weapons agents that may be present at LLNL s BSL-3 Facility in quantities up to one
liter as described in the Environmental Assessment (Appendix A, p. A-24). In the first set of
HPAC calculations, the release of Anthrax from LLNL is made under the following
assumptions:
• 5 grams of Anthrax (about two teaspoons of dry spores) are initially present at the LLNL
biological weapons research facility;
• LLNL s BSL-3 facility is lightly damaged;
• prevailing winds at the time of the incident were modeled using historical weather data
provided with the HPAC computer code; and
• the incident occurs at mid-day.
6. The quantity of Anthrax chosen for this scenario is hypothetical. Approximately two
grams of Anthrax were present in the letter opened by one of Senator Daschle s staff on October
15, 2001, resulting in the 96-day closure of the Hart Senate Office Building and the presumed
infection of approximately 50 persons. Inhalation of 0.01 to 0.08 millionths of a gram of
Anthrax spores can produce pulmonary anthrax that is fatal within about four days. Two grams
of Anthrax, therefore, represents up to 25 million times the inhaled lethal dose.
7. For these scenarios, the HPAC computer model calculates Anthrax dosage for areas
downwind of LLNL. Dosage is a measure of cumulative exposure to biological agent, or the
concentration of biological warfare agent to which a person is exposed summed over the time of
exposure. The units of dosage are milligram-minutes per cubic meter (mg-min/m3) milligrams
of agent per cubic meter of air (concentration) multiplied by the time of exposure. The database
of biological weapons agents included with HPAC contains the expected fatality rate for
exposure to a given dosage of Anthrax. According to this database, a person exposed to Anthrax
at a dosage of 0.036 mg-min/m3 would have a 90% chance of dying from the disease (without
antibiotic treatment). A dosage for which 90% of individuals would die from the exposure is
referred to as LCt90. This dosage would approximately correspond to a person inhaling half a
millionth of a gram of Anthrax (assuming a breathing rate of 17 liters per minute). At lower
dosages exposed persons have a correspondingly lower chance of dying from Anthrax. A person
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
exposed to Anthrax at a dosage of 0.00000063 mg-min/m3 (or inhaling less than a billionth of a
gram of Anthrax) is assumed to have a 2% chance of dying from the disease. A dosage for
which 2% of individuals would die from the exposure is referred to as LCt2.
8. For the first set of calculations the release of Anthrax was modeled using historical
weather data. HPAC calculated that a plume of Anthrax spores corresponding to a dosage of
LCt2 would spread out from LLNL to a distance of between 20 and 40 miles. From April
through September the Anthrax would be carried in a southeasterly direction over sparsely
populated areas, where from 300 to 1,100 people would be exposed to a dosage of LCt2. Thus,
without antibiotic treatment, HPAC would predict 6 to 22 fatalities. In other months the Anthrax
would be carried westerly by the prevailing winds, exposing tens of thousands of individuals to
a dosage of LCt2. The maximum exposure was calculated for the month of February, in which
128,000 people were calculated to be exposed to a dosage of LCt2, corresponding to 2,500 fatal
infections without antibiotic treatment. Figures 1 and 2, below, show the calculated Anthrax
plume corresponding to a dosage of LCt2 for the months of February and September.
Figure 1: An HPAC calculation of the release of Anthrax following light damage at the LLNL BSL-3 facility with
winds typical for the month of September. The Anthrax plume shown in orange extends in a southeasterly
direction from the Lab over sparsely populated areas, where HPAC calculates from 300 to 1,100 people would be
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
exposed to a dosage of LCt2. For this calculation it was assumed that 5 grams of Anthrax was initially present at
facility.
Figure 2: An HPAC calculation of the release of Anthrax following light damage at the LLNL BSL-3 facility with
winds typical for the month of February. The Anthrax plume shown in orange extends in a southwesterly
direction from the Lab over densely populated areas, where HPAC calculates 128,000 people were calculated to be
exposed to a dosage of LCt2. For this calculation it was assumed that 5 grams of Anthrax was initially present at
facility.
9. In my second set of calculations the winds were fixed to blow towards downtown San
Francisco at a speed of 9 miles per hour (i.e., a gentle breeze). Under these prevailing winds, the
HPAC code calculates that 373,000 people would be exposed to a dosage of LCt2,
corresponding to 7,500 fatal infections without antibiotic treatment. HPAC predicts that even in
a lightly-damaged facility containing a small quantity of Anthrax here two teaspoons of dry
spores the release of the agent can, with certain prevailing winds, cause mass casualties. In the
specific case of an incident at LLNL the prevailing winds for half of the year, based on
historical weather patterns, would blow the agent toward densely-populated areas. The figure
below shows the Anthrax plume corresponding to a dosage of LCt2 for winds specified to be a
light breeze blowing from LLNL towards downtown San Francisco.
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
10. For my third set of calculations I inputted the damage to the LLNL BSL-3 facility as
severe, corresponding to three times as much biological weapons agent released as in the first
two sets of calculations. Using historical weather data, from 4,000 to 7,000 people would be
exposed to a dosage of LCt2 from the months of April through September when the prevailing
winds are in the south-easterly direction, and upwards of 240,000 people would be exposed to a
dosage of LCt2 during the other months, corresponding to about 4,800 fatalities. When the
winds were fixed to blow towards downtown San Francisco at a speed of 9 miles per hour (i.e.,
a gentle breeze), over one-half million people were calculated to be exposed to a dosage of
LCt2, corresponding to more than 10,000 fatal Anthrax infections without antibiotic treatment.
This calculation is illustrated in Figure 3, below.
Figure 3: An HPAC calculation of the release of Anthrax following severe damage at the LLNL BSL-3 facility
with winds specified to be a light breeze blowing from LLNL towards downtown San Francisco. HPAC calculates
over one-half million people would be exposed to a dosage of LCt2. For this calculation it was assumed that 5
grams of Anthrax was initially present at facility.
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
11. There are large uncertainties associated with these calculations due to the uncertainties
in quantity of agent, the degree of contamination, the nature of the postulated accident, and the
variability of the weather. Nevertheless, these calculations demonstrate the potential for
significant fatalities in the event of an accident at the proposed BSL-3 facility.
12. HPAC can be used to model the release of other biological agents under varying weather
conditions and other incident parameters. A thorough exploration of the risk posed by the
presence of a biological agent near a densely-populated area can be made by such a parametric
analysis, and must be a key aspect of the environmental assessment of LLNL s BSL-3 facility
so that public health and safety can be better assured. In my opinion, it is a glaring and obvious
omission that the LLNL BSL-3 Environmental Assessment has failed to do so, particularly
given the expertise in biological weapons and plume modeling which can be found at the U.S.
National Laboratories.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my
information and belief. Executed on February 11, 2004 in Washington, D.C.
____________________
MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE
Staff Scientist
Natural Resources Defense Council
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Exhibit 1
Matthew Gordon McKinzie Curriculum Vitae
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Resources Defense Council
1200 New York Ave., NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20005
202-289-2363
e-mail: mmckinzie@nrdc.org
Personal Information:
Date of Birth: August 20, 1966
Citizenship: United States
Education:
August 1995 Ph.D., Nuclear Physics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Dissertation: Inelastic Scattering and Single and Double Charge Exchange
Reactions within the A=27 Isobaric Multiplet
Dissertation Advisor: Professor H. Terry Fortune, Department of Physics,
University of Pennsylvania
June 1988 B.A., Physics, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York
Summer Terms at Harvard University (1985) and the Center for Medieval and
Renaissance Studies, Keeble College, Oxford University (1986)
John Bard Scholar, 1988
Professional Employment:
June 1997 - present: Staff Scientist, Nuclear Program, Natural Resources Defense Council,
Washington, DC
September 1995 - June 1997: Postdoctoral Associate, Mario Einaudi Center for International
Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
1988 - 1995: Graduate Research Assistant, Department of Physics, University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
1990 - 1992: Summer Graduate Research Assistant, Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Los Alamos, NM
Summer 1987: National Science Foundation Undergraduate Fellow, Laser-Molecular
Beam Laboratory, Department of Chemistry, Columbia University, New York, NY
Summer 1984: Quabbin Wire and Cable, Ware, MA
Software consultant, programmer, graphics design
Summer 1983: University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Summer research student, Alaskan Environment Expedition
Publications:
The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change, with Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris
and William M. Arkin, Natural Resources Defense Council, June, 2001.
Toward True Security: A US Nuclear Posture for the Next Decade, with Bruce G. Blair,
Thomas B. Cochran, Tom Z. Collina, Jonathan Dean, Steve Fetter, Richard L. Garwin, Kurt
Gottfried, Lisbeth Gronlund, Henry Kelly, Robert S. Norris, Adam Segal, Robert Sherman,
Frank N. von Hippel, David Wright and Stephen Young (Federation of American Scientists,
Natural Resources Defense Council and the Union of Concerned Scientists), June 2001.
(www.ucsusa.org/publications/NPRall.pdf)
Declassified and Never Classified: A Focus on Proliferation in Secrecy Versus Openness:
Finding a Balance at the Department of Energy, Proceedings of a Workshop held on November
29, 1999 at John F. Kennedy School of Government, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard University
(http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/MTA-openness#never)
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Issues and Answers (editor), Cornell University Peace
Studies Program Occasional Paper #21, June 1997.
(http://www.einaudi.cornell.edu/PeaceProgram/Paper21/contents.html)
Energy dependence of cross sections for double charge exchange on 60,62,64 Ni, with H. T.
Fortune, D. R. Benton, J. M. Odonnell, R. Crittenden, E. Insko, K. Griffioen, N. Claytor, and D.
L. Watson. Physical Review C (1997)
Gamow-Teller strength in 60,62,64Ni(n,p) reactions at 198 MeV, with A. L. Williams, W. P.
Alford, E. Brash, B. A. Brown, S. Burzynski, H. T. Fortune, O. Hausser, R. Helmer, R.
Henderson, P. P. Hui, K. P. Jackson, B. Larson, D. A. Smith, A. Trudel and M. Vetterli.
Physical Review C 51, 1144 (1995).
Interference effects in nonanalog pion double charge exchange, with H. T. Fortune, P. Hui, R.
Ivie, C. Laymon, X. Li, S. Loe, D. A. Smith, A. L. Williams, J. M O Donnell, S. Blanchard, G.
R. Burleson, and B. Lail, Physical Review C, 49, 2054 (1994).
Pion double charge exchange on nickel isotopes and generalized seniority, with D. R. Benton,
H. T. Fortune, J. M. O Donnell, R. Crittenden, E. Insko, R. Ivie, D. Smith, and J. D. Silk,
Physical Review C 47, 140 (1993).
Professional Presentations:
Exploring the Dimensions of Nuclear Conflict in South Asia, National Advisory Council on
South Asian Affairs Symposium: Is South Asia the Most Dangerous Place on Earth?, April 6,
2002, Wyndham Hotel, City Center, Washington, DC
Simulating Global Thermonuclear War, Plenary Panel at the 2001 Carnegie International
Non-Proliferation Conference (moderator Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University; fellow-panelists
Thomas Cochran and Robert S. Norris), June 19, Ronald Reagan Building and International
Trade Center, Washinton, DC.
Issues Surrounding U.S. Congressional Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(conference organizer and participant) held at the Peace Studies Program, Cornell University,
Ithaca, NY, October 11-13, 1996.
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Fissile Material Stocks and National Security: an Examination of Current and Potential Future
Policies of the United States, presented at the Eighth Annual Summer Symposium on Science
and World Affairs, Beijing, China (23-21 July, 1996).
Discussant (Climate Models), Simulating Knowledge: Cultural Analysis of Computer Modeling
in the Life Sciences, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY (19-21 April, 1996)
Security Aspects of the Future of Global Energy Resources, given at the Seventh
International Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs, Kiev, Ukraine (September 16-
25, 1995).
Cross sections for transitions of the _L>0 in the reactions 27Al, 13C(n,p) at Tn=198 MeV,
Bulletin of the American Physical Society 39, 1008 (1994).
The (n,p) Reaction on 27Al and 13C at 198 MeV, Bull. Am. Phys. Soc. 38, 1830 (1993).
Interference Effects in Non-Analog Pion DCX, Bull. Am. Phys. Soc. 38, 1816 (1993).
Inelastic pion scattering from 27Al, 28Si, Bull. Am. Phys. Soc. 37, 1303 (1992).
THIS IS A NATIONAL ISSUE, A SURVIVAL ISSUE FOR US ALL.
Though this information is extremely disturbing, I think we must be strong enough to face the truth of what is happening right now, and do what we can to stop it. We should also take care to keep ourselves in the best shape to deal with such issues. I suggest the following:
Keep as healthy as you can. Don't become part of the problem (of keeping the world safe). Good health makes it easier to deal with depresssing issues.
Keep in touch with your friends. You will find comfort and support from others who are also willing to know the truth, however disturbing.
Act in the best way for you. If you are willing, contact your representatives in congress and your fellow citizens. These issues concern us all, on many counts. Do the things that Jan suggests above.
Do things to keep your spirits up--give yourself permission to enjoy whatever give you a "lift."
Don't turn away in denial.
If you can and want to contribute money to this cause (now carried by a handful of folks), here is how:
Contributions can be made online at www.trivalleycares.org or by mail to Tri-Valley CAREs, 2582 Old First Street, Livermore, CA 94551. It is a 501c3
Here is her message:
From: "Jan Coleman"
Yahoo! DomainKeys has confirmed that this message was sent by mindspring.com. Learn more
To: "Jan Coleman"
Subject: URGENT MESSAGE FOR BAY AREA RESIDENTS--ACTION NEEDED IMMEDIATELY!!
Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2006 00:43:09 -0700
Friends in the Bay Area:
This may be the most important email message I have ever sent to you—so please take time to read the following:
The Defense Dept and Homeland Security for “national security purposes” have designated Livermore Labs in the East Bay for a secret bio-defense lab, a facility in which they will test (on animals) forms of biological and chemical agents that could be used by terrorists. The agents will be aerosolized and, should they become airborne outside the facility, “they could kill hundreds to thousands of Bay Area residents within a 50-mile radius of the lab (including San Francisco and San Jose)”, say the experts. The structure is on a fault line—and would be a possible target for anyone who would like to do harm to the US.
The required public safety and environmental studies were not done and the matter is in the 13th District Court—but the decision for them to proceed could go either way. I am alarmed that I have not been able to find others in the area that know about this. I made contact with the lawyer handling the case and learned that BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN NO PUBLIC OUTCRY, Tracy, CA, is on a short list for a large acreage to be turned into a testing site for large animals—another “PLUM ISLAND” IN OUR BACKYARD!!
Timing is crucial now! We must speak out and get all politicians, mayors and city councils, environmental groups, animal rights organizations, local and national organizations to stand and be counted—we must create a PUBLIC OUTCRY! The small office in Livermore that is trying to fight the issue needs our help—they have only a couple staff people and are grossly underfunded for such an effort.
I am writing to ask your support in whatever way you can give it. I don’t know how I can take on one more thing right now, but realize I have been having sleepless nights and must SPEAK OUT! I will be happy to play contact point as we begin but am asking you to step forward and help create a team of leaders around this issue. Here are some ways to assist:
Put the word out wherever you can—to your local officials, media, organizations to which you belong locally and nationally.
Let me know what you are willing to do so I can pass on the info to leaders as they emerge.
Put email “chains” in place so when material is sent to you, you can pass it down the chain.
Learn the facts of the issue—I have attached a “fact sheet” from the Livermore office and the link to an informed article in yesterday’s Washington Post which tells about another secret lab being constructed in Maryland and shows a brief video with more info:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/29/AR2006072900592.html?referrer=email
I was told that these bio-defense labs are being sited in several places in the US, including a low-income neighborhood in Boston!
If you don’t live in the Bay Area, you may wish to find out if a secret bio-defense lab is scheduled for your area. And please reach out to anyone you may know in the Bay Area—or organizations/individuals may be of help to us.
A question has been raised as to the suitability of the staff at Livermore for handling this type of testing as they are nuclear scientists, not geneticists.
Thank you for your attention to this matter. I wish it were better news. Many have asked how they can “do something” to change many of the decisions being made on our behalf in this country. Here is one way—start right in our own neighborhood!
Respectfully,
Jan
_____________________________________________________________________
Jan Coleman
415-331-6633
jancoleman@mindspring.com
"If the success or failure of this planet, of human beings,
depended on how I am and what I do,
How would I be? What would I do?"
-- R. Buckminster Fuller
Attachments Attachment scanning provided by:
Files:
Livermore_Bio_Defense_Lab_Bio_FactSheet.doc (42k) [Preview] Scan and Save to Computer - Save to Yahoo! Briefcase
Livermore_Bio_Defense_Lab___McKinzieDeclaration.pdf_2.pdf (468k) Scan and Save to Computer - Save to Yahoo! Briefcase
Now here are the fact sheets which she attached to her original message:
Basic Facts about Livermore Lab’s Bio-warfare Agent Facility
The Department of Energy’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has ordered a 1500 square foot prefabricated building that will house a high-level Bio-Warfare Agent Laboratory inside LLNL. Up to 100 Liters of bio-agents will be used there at any one time. Researchers will aerosolize and genetically modify agents such as plague, anthrax, botulism and rabbit fever. This is a historic decision because these types of high-level agent experiments have never before been located inside a nuclear weapons research laboratory.
Where will it be located? It will be located in the heart of Livermore Laboratory – a 1.3 square mile facility with nearly 10,000 on-site workers, and residential housing developments built right up to the fence line of the Livermore Lab. The Department of Energy considers a 50 miles radius around the lab as the “affected environment” for releases and impacts. This area encompasses the cities of San Jose and San Francisco.
What Agents will the lab experiment on? The lab is a Bio-safety Level 3 (BSL-3) lab, housing a level three select agents lab (level 4 is the highest and is reserved for Bio-Agents with no preventative treatment or known cure). Agents in a BSL-3 are known to cause serious or potentially lethal disease as a result of inhalation. This lab can use any select agents – select agents are organisms that “have historically been associated with weaponizing efforts”.
What Types of Experiments are planned? Experiments will genetically modify these agents and aerosolize them (spray them) onto testing animals inside of special cabinets. The risks posed by genetically modified pathogens have never undergone a broad independent assessment. The lab will infect a maximum of 100 animals at a time, consisting of mainly mice with some rats and guinea pigs. Scientists and policy makers are concerned that genetic modifications could accidentally or intentionally create super-strains that have no known treatment or cure ultimately resulting in bio-weapons of the future. The environmental study conducted by the lab did not include any information about the nature of the genetic modification that DOE plans to conduct or how the lab will manage the hazards inherent in this work.
· Hazards of Genetic Modification: In Sept, 2003 UC Berkeley researchers admitted that they had accidentally created a super-strain of tuberculosis (TB) through genetic modification of ordinary TB that multiplied faster and was more lethal. US government studies have also led to the creation of extremely deadly forms of mousepox, rabbitpox and cowpox. The mousepox is impervious to anti-viral drugs and vaccines.
· Hazards of Aerosolization: Aerosolization of select agents is potentially a form of weaponizing them. A gaseous suspension of fine particles resulting from aerosolization makes these agents far more dangerous due to accidental occupational exposure and, in the case of failure of containment, exposure of civilians outside of the facility.
· Civilian Science: Livermore Lab heralds its “bio-defense” work as key to US defenses against a biological attack. Tri-Valley CAREs does not oppose experiments needed to create bio-detectors or legitimate bio-defense work. Tri-Valley CAREs opposes having this work located inside a super-secret classified nuclear weapons laboratory.
· Lack of Independent Oversight: No independent regulatory agency is responsible for safety at LLNL on a continuing basis. Safety is a matter of self-regulation. This type of management hasn’t worked at other federal labs where the anthrax used in the letters to the media and government officials was most likely derived.
· Dual-Use Nature of this Research: The bio-warfare agent research at Livermore Lab is inherently dual-use. Although DOE states that this lab is purely defensive – there always remains a chance that they could be used for offensive weapons research. The “defensive research” at LLNL will be virtually indistinguishable from “offensive research”. With the secrecy of the program, the US aversion to inspection or verification protocols at the Biological Weapons Convention, the opaque nature of the Institutional Biosafety Committee, and with the lack of independent transparent oversight, no one will know for sure what type of research will be conducted there.
Bad Public Process: The Department of Energy approved this new BSL-3 lab without any public hearings or a thorough environmental review. Many community members appealed to the lab and to the Livermore City Council for public hearings without result. Many unstudied environmental hazards would have been analyzed in a comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement. Further, labs like this one are opening all over the country as congress passed billions for bio-defense without any coordinated plan. Thousands of new employees will be trained to work in these labs making it difficult to prevent theft of information and bio-agents.
· Tri-Valley CAREs filed suit to challenge the legality of the Energy Department’s decision not to conduct a full Environmental Impact Statement. Although the court agreed that many of our arguments were persuasive, the court ruled in favor of the government citing the significant discretion given to government agencies in the law. We are appealing this decision.
Environmental Dangers? LLNL is currently on the EPA’s list of most contaminated sites in the U.S.
· HEPA air filters: The Lab will rely upon HEPA filters to prevent environmental release of deadly bio-agents. LLNL retired physicist Marion Fulk argues that HEPA filters become ineffective when wet or torn and routinely allow some particles to escape.
· Seismic Concerns: The lab sits within one kilometer of the Las Positas and Greenville faults. An earthquake in 1980 injured 44 people and cost the lab many millions in structural damages. Today, 108 buildings have potential seismic problems, 22 have unacceptable risks and 41 wait for detailed evaluation, including buildings where genetic modification will be conducted.
· History of Accidents / Spills: Although LLNL boasts its perfect record of no recorded infections by lab workers, our investigations found that they had several mishaps in the past with their lower level, less-infectious agents where employees poked themselves with needles and possibly threw anthrax contaminated waste out with the general trash.
o CDC does not formally track lab-acquired infections and all infections are voluntarily reported. As a result, we have no accurate information about infections, releases and accidents. Infections often go under-reported because lab directors fear reprisal and because journals only publish infections that are new, rare or unusual.
· Transportation Dangers: Shipments will travel by FedEx or other commercial courier service. LLNL estimates 60 shipments (in and out) per month.
o Incidents Elsewhere: On October 6, 2004 – a package containing 5 tubes of TB was stolen in Barcelona, Spain. In June of 2004, Oakland Children’s Hospital called in the FBI after they found purportedly attenuated anthrax shipments to be live and dangerous.
Proliferation Threats: Over the last decade or more, the US has demonstrated that it values the secrecy of its commercial and military facilities more highly than the transparency that is needed for effective international monitoring of compliance with the requirements of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Collocation of nuclear and biological warfare agent research at Livermore Lab could lead other countries to follow-suit causing nearly insurmountable verification problems. Identifying whether a bio-lab is conducting offensive research is generally a matter of intent of the researcher since many of the experiments are the same whether they be for peaceful purposes or for developing a biological weapons program.
· Tri-Valley CAREs believes that bio-warfare agent research should be conducted under the auspices of civilian science centers and not inside classified nuclear weapons laboratories with strengthened oversight and reporting requirements. Tri-Valley CAREs attended the BWC meeting in December of 2004.
Institutional Biosafety Committees: Keepers of the BWC ? LLNL claims that its IBC will review all projects involving high-level bio-agents to ensure that experiments comply with international prohibitions against development of bio-weapons and with all other health and safety laws.
o The National Institute of Health requires IBC’s to make minutes available to the public and recommends that they hold open meetings. LLNL’s IBC has refused to release redacted minutes for at least seven months after the meeting is held. Numerous requests by Tri-Valley CAREs to attend IBC meetings or even be alerted when they are held have been plainly denied.
o Community Members: The lab claims to include “community members” on the IBC, however, such members’ names and background information were redacted. According to a study of IBCs, Livemore Lab stands alone in redacting this info.
Take Action!
o Send money – we need to raise $15,000 to support our appeal.
o Write letters to editor
o Speak out at City Council meetings – local club meetings
o Demand that the IBC meetings be open to the public and transparent and have a seat for a true member of the public.
o Read Tri-Valley CAREs newsletter for updates and contact our office to get involved.
(Here is the "McKinzie Brief," the case now being presented in court that Jan refers to above. The blank spaces are where diagrams and drawings appear in the original document. If you are interested, e-mail me and I will send you the attachments which contain these images. My address is dorothywalters2@sbcglobal.net)
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
STEPHAN C. VOLKER (CSB #63093)
HEATHER A. DAGEN (CSB #217837)
GRETCHEN E. DENT (CSB #222184)
LAW OFFICES OF STEPHAN C. VOLKER
436 14th Street, Suite 1300
Oakland, California 94612
Telephone: 510/496-0600
Facsimile: 510/496-1366
ALLETTA BELIN, ESQ.
BELIN & SUGARMAN
618 Paseo de Peralta
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501
Telephone: 505/983-8936
Facsimile: 505/983-0036
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
TRI-VALLEY CARES, NUCLEAR
WATCH OF NEW MEXICO, MARYLIA KELLEY,
JANIS KATE TURNER, TARA DORABJI,
HENRY C. FINNEY and CATHERINE SULLIVAN
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
TRI-VALLEY CAREs, NUCLEAR WATCH
OF NEW MEXICO, MARYLIA KELLEY,
JANIS KATE TURNER, TARA DORABJI,
HENRY C. FINNEY and CATHERINE
SULLIVAN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY, NATIONAL NUCLEAR
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL
LABORATORY, and LOS ALAMOS
NATIONAL LABORATORY,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA
DECLARATION OF
MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
I, MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE, declare as follows:
1. I am a scientist for the Nuclear Program of the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC). I have been in this position since 1997. I received my doctorate in physics in 1995
from the University of Pennsylvania, specializing in experimental nuclear physics, and
subsequently held an appointment as a Postdoctoral Associate at the Mario Einaudi Center for
International Studies at Cornell University. I have worked professionally on the topic of
Weapons of Mass Destruction as a scientist and analyst at Cornell and the NRDC for eight
years. My research has been published in NRDC and Cornell research reports and a peerreviewed
technical journal, and I have lectured widely in University and U.S. government
settings. I have been interviewed on numerous occasions as an expert on Weapons of Mass
Destruction on national television and in the print media. My research has included the use of
computer models, satellite imagery and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to simulate the
consequences of the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. A copy of my curriculum vitae is
attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
2. In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks there has been an increased use within
the U.S. Government of computer models designed to calculate the dispersal of chemical,
biological or radiological agents. One computer model that currently has widespread use in the
U.S. military and emergency first-responder communities is HPAC, which stands for Hazard
Prediction and Assessment Capability. HPAC was developed to accurately predict the effects of
hazardous material releases into the atmosphere and calculate the corresponding impacts on
civilian and military populations. The HPAC software is distributed by the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA), an agency of the U.S. Department of Defense. The NRDC is a
licensed user of HPAC.
3. The HPAC software includes a computer model that calculates the mass of biological
agent expelled from a damaged biological weapons storage or production facility: the Biological
FACilities (BFAC) source term model. This damage is presumed to involve an explosion in the
interior of the facility that may be caused by, for example, an accident, an attack, or an external
event such as an earthquake (which is a predictable concern for the Livermore, California area).
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
If there is limited knowledge about the interior of the biological weapons facility, the BFAC
model contains a Facility Category Damage Sub-model in which only the biological agent type,
total mass of agent and a level of damage to the facility (light, moderate, severe or total) needs
to be specified as input to the computer program. According to the HPAC documentation
(HPAC Version 3.2.1), this sub-model then yields conservative estimates of material released
based on the understandings of experts in the associated technical fields. No viability
degradation of the biological agent is assumed in this type of calculation. It should be noted that
at least one of the agents that will be stored and handled at the Biological Safety Level 3 (BSL-
3) facility proposed to be located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL, or the
Lab ), Coxiella burnetii (Q fever), has a strong capability of surviving in the open environment
(LLNL BSL-3 Environmental Assessment, p. 51). Historical wind data provided in associated
HPAC databases may be used to calculate the transport of released biological agent away from
the damaged facility. Alternatively, fixed wind parameters including wind speed and direction
may be directly inputted into HPAC for the calculation.
4. The LLNL is located at 37o 41 North and 121o 42 West in Alameda County
approximately 40 miles east of San Francisco. According to the 2000 U.S. census data analyzed
by census blocks in the vicinity of the Lab, approximately 2,100 people live within one mile of
LLNL, 69,000 people within 5 miles, 123,000 people within 10 miles and 7.2 million people
live within 50 miles of the Lab. Just how far a biological agent would be dispersed in a
hypothetical incident at LLNL would depend on the severity of damage to the facility (and thus
the amount of viable biological agent released) and the speed and direction of the prevailing
winds. The number of initial infections would depend on the type of agent, how widely the
agent was dispersed at varying concentrations and the precise number of exposed persons. The
total number of infections caused by such an incident could be greater than the number of
initially infected persons, however, when potential infections from subsequent contagion are
also factored in.
5. In this declaration, I illustrate several calculations of the release of Anthrax from
postulated incidents at LLNL using the HPAC computer model. Anthrax is one of several
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
biological weapons agents that may be present at LLNL s BSL-3 Facility in quantities up to one
liter as described in the Environmental Assessment (Appendix A, p. A-24). In the first set of
HPAC calculations, the release of Anthrax from LLNL is made under the following
assumptions:
• 5 grams of Anthrax (about two teaspoons of dry spores) are initially present at the LLNL
biological weapons research facility;
• LLNL s BSL-3 facility is lightly damaged;
• prevailing winds at the time of the incident were modeled using historical weather data
provided with the HPAC computer code; and
• the incident occurs at mid-day.
6. The quantity of Anthrax chosen for this scenario is hypothetical. Approximately two
grams of Anthrax were present in the letter opened by one of Senator Daschle s staff on October
15, 2001, resulting in the 96-day closure of the Hart Senate Office Building and the presumed
infection of approximately 50 persons. Inhalation of 0.01 to 0.08 millionths of a gram of
Anthrax spores can produce pulmonary anthrax that is fatal within about four days. Two grams
of Anthrax, therefore, represents up to 25 million times the inhaled lethal dose.
7. For these scenarios, the HPAC computer model calculates Anthrax dosage for areas
downwind of LLNL. Dosage is a measure of cumulative exposure to biological agent, or the
concentration of biological warfare agent to which a person is exposed summed over the time of
exposure. The units of dosage are milligram-minutes per cubic meter (mg-min/m3) milligrams
of agent per cubic meter of air (concentration) multiplied by the time of exposure. The database
of biological weapons agents included with HPAC contains the expected fatality rate for
exposure to a given dosage of Anthrax. According to this database, a person exposed to Anthrax
at a dosage of 0.036 mg-min/m3 would have a 90% chance of dying from the disease (without
antibiotic treatment). A dosage for which 90% of individuals would die from the exposure is
referred to as LCt90. This dosage would approximately correspond to a person inhaling half a
millionth of a gram of Anthrax (assuming a breathing rate of 17 liters per minute). At lower
dosages exposed persons have a correspondingly lower chance of dying from Anthrax. A person
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
exposed to Anthrax at a dosage of 0.00000063 mg-min/m3 (or inhaling less than a billionth of a
gram of Anthrax) is assumed to have a 2% chance of dying from the disease. A dosage for
which 2% of individuals would die from the exposure is referred to as LCt2.
8. For the first set of calculations the release of Anthrax was modeled using historical
weather data. HPAC calculated that a plume of Anthrax spores corresponding to a dosage of
LCt2 would spread out from LLNL to a distance of between 20 and 40 miles. From April
through September the Anthrax would be carried in a southeasterly direction over sparsely
populated areas, where from 300 to 1,100 people would be exposed to a dosage of LCt2. Thus,
without antibiotic treatment, HPAC would predict 6 to 22 fatalities. In other months the Anthrax
would be carried westerly by the prevailing winds, exposing tens of thousands of individuals to
a dosage of LCt2. The maximum exposure was calculated for the month of February, in which
128,000 people were calculated to be exposed to a dosage of LCt2, corresponding to 2,500 fatal
infections without antibiotic treatment. Figures 1 and 2, below, show the calculated Anthrax
plume corresponding to a dosage of LCt2 for the months of February and September.
Figure 1: An HPAC calculation of the release of Anthrax following light damage at the LLNL BSL-3 facility with
winds typical for the month of September. The Anthrax plume shown in orange extends in a southeasterly
direction from the Lab over sparsely populated areas, where HPAC calculates from 300 to 1,100 people would be
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
exposed to a dosage of LCt2. For this calculation it was assumed that 5 grams of Anthrax was initially present at
facility.
Figure 2: An HPAC calculation of the release of Anthrax following light damage at the LLNL BSL-3 facility with
winds typical for the month of February. The Anthrax plume shown in orange extends in a southwesterly
direction from the Lab over densely populated areas, where HPAC calculates 128,000 people were calculated to be
exposed to a dosage of LCt2. For this calculation it was assumed that 5 grams of Anthrax was initially present at
facility.
9. In my second set of calculations the winds were fixed to blow towards downtown San
Francisco at a speed of 9 miles per hour (i.e., a gentle breeze). Under these prevailing winds, the
HPAC code calculates that 373,000 people would be exposed to a dosage of LCt2,
corresponding to 7,500 fatal infections without antibiotic treatment. HPAC predicts that even in
a lightly-damaged facility containing a small quantity of Anthrax here two teaspoons of dry
spores the release of the agent can, with certain prevailing winds, cause mass casualties. In the
specific case of an incident at LLNL the prevailing winds for half of the year, based on
historical weather patterns, would blow the agent toward densely-populated areas. The figure
below shows the Anthrax plume corresponding to a dosage of LCt2 for winds specified to be a
light breeze blowing from LLNL towards downtown San Francisco.
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
10. For my third set of calculations I inputted the damage to the LLNL BSL-3 facility as
severe, corresponding to three times as much biological weapons agent released as in the first
two sets of calculations. Using historical weather data, from 4,000 to 7,000 people would be
exposed to a dosage of LCt2 from the months of April through September when the prevailing
winds are in the south-easterly direction, and upwards of 240,000 people would be exposed to a
dosage of LCt2 during the other months, corresponding to about 4,800 fatalities. When the
winds were fixed to blow towards downtown San Francisco at a speed of 9 miles per hour (i.e.,
a gentle breeze), over one-half million people were calculated to be exposed to a dosage of
LCt2, corresponding to more than 10,000 fatal Anthrax infections without antibiotic treatment.
This calculation is illustrated in Figure 3, below.
Figure 3: An HPAC calculation of the release of Anthrax following severe damage at the LLNL BSL-3 facility
with winds specified to be a light breeze blowing from LLNL towards downtown San Francisco. HPAC calculates
over one-half million people would be exposed to a dosage of LCt2. For this calculation it was assumed that 5
grams of Anthrax was initially present at facility.
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
11. There are large uncertainties associated with these calculations due to the uncertainties
in quantity of agent, the degree of contamination, the nature of the postulated accident, and the
variability of the weather. Nevertheless, these calculations demonstrate the potential for
significant fatalities in the event of an accident at the proposed BSL-3 facility.
12. HPAC can be used to model the release of other biological agents under varying weather
conditions and other incident parameters. A thorough exploration of the risk posed by the
presence of a biological agent near a densely-populated area can be made by such a parametric
analysis, and must be a key aspect of the environmental assessment of LLNL s BSL-3 facility
so that public health and safety can be better assured. In my opinion, it is a glaring and obvious
omission that the LLNL BSL-3 Environmental Assessment has failed to do so, particularly
given the expertise in biological weapons and plume modeling which can be found at the U.S.
National Laboratories.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my
information and belief. Executed on February 11, 2004 in Washington, D.C.
____________________
MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE
Staff Scientist
Natural Resources Defense Council
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Exhibit 1
Matthew Gordon McKinzie Curriculum Vitae
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Resources Defense Council
1200 New York Ave., NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20005
202-289-2363
e-mail: mmckinzie@nrdc.org
Personal Information:
Date of Birth: August 20, 1966
Citizenship: United States
Education:
August 1995 Ph.D., Nuclear Physics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Dissertation: Inelastic Scattering and Single and Double Charge Exchange
Reactions within the A=27 Isobaric Multiplet
Dissertation Advisor: Professor H. Terry Fortune, Department of Physics,
University of Pennsylvania
June 1988 B.A., Physics, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York
Summer Terms at Harvard University (1985) and the Center for Medieval and
Renaissance Studies, Keeble College, Oxford University (1986)
John Bard Scholar, 1988
Professional Employment:
June 1997 - present: Staff Scientist, Nuclear Program, Natural Resources Defense Council,
Washington, DC
September 1995 - June 1997: Postdoctoral Associate, Mario Einaudi Center for International
Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
1988 - 1995: Graduate Research Assistant, Department of Physics, University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
1990 - 1992: Summer Graduate Research Assistant, Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Los Alamos, NM
Summer 1987: National Science Foundation Undergraduate Fellow, Laser-Molecular
Beam Laboratory, Department of Chemistry, Columbia University, New York, NY
Summer 1984: Quabbin Wire and Cable, Ware, MA
Software consultant, programmer, graphics design
Summer 1983: University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Summer research student, Alaskan Environment Expedition
Publications:
The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change, with Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris
and William M. Arkin, Natural Resources Defense Council, June, 2001.
Toward True Security: A US Nuclear Posture for the Next Decade, with Bruce G. Blair,
Thomas B. Cochran, Tom Z. Collina, Jonathan Dean, Steve Fetter, Richard L. Garwin, Kurt
Gottfried, Lisbeth Gronlund, Henry Kelly, Robert S. Norris, Adam Segal, Robert Sherman,
Frank N. von Hippel, David Wright and Stephen Young (Federation of American Scientists,
Natural Resources Defense Council and the Union of Concerned Scientists), June 2001.
(www.ucsusa.org/publications/NPRall.pdf)
Declassified and Never Classified: A Focus on Proliferation in Secrecy Versus Openness:
Finding a Balance at the Department of Energy, Proceedings of a Workshop held on November
29, 1999 at John F. Kennedy School of Government, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard University
(http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/MTA-openness#never)
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Issues and Answers (editor), Cornell University Peace
Studies Program Occasional Paper #21, June 1997.
(http://www.einaudi.cornell.edu/PeaceProgram/Paper21/contents.html)
Energy dependence of cross sections for double charge exchange on 60,62,64 Ni, with H. T.
Fortune, D. R. Benton, J. M. Odonnell, R. Crittenden, E. Insko, K. Griffioen, N. Claytor, and D.
L. Watson. Physical Review C (1997)
Gamow-Teller strength in 60,62,64Ni(n,p) reactions at 198 MeV, with A. L. Williams, W. P.
Alford, E. Brash, B. A. Brown, S. Burzynski, H. T. Fortune, O. Hausser, R. Helmer, R.
Henderson, P. P. Hui, K. P. Jackson, B. Larson, D. A. Smith, A. Trudel and M. Vetterli.
Physical Review C 51, 1144 (1995).
Interference effects in nonanalog pion double charge exchange, with H. T. Fortune, P. Hui, R.
Ivie, C. Laymon, X. Li, S. Loe, D. A. Smith, A. L. Williams, J. M O Donnell, S. Blanchard, G.
R. Burleson, and B. Lail, Physical Review C, 49, 2054 (1994).
Pion double charge exchange on nickel isotopes and generalized seniority, with D. R. Benton,
H. T. Fortune, J. M. O Donnell, R. Crittenden, E. Insko, R. Ivie, D. Smith, and J. D. Silk,
Physical Review C 47, 140 (1993).
Professional Presentations:
Exploring the Dimensions of Nuclear Conflict in South Asia, National Advisory Council on
South Asian Affairs Symposium: Is South Asia the Most Dangerous Place on Earth?, April 6,
2002, Wyndham Hotel, City Center, Washington, DC
Simulating Global Thermonuclear War, Plenary Panel at the 2001 Carnegie International
Non-Proliferation Conference (moderator Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University; fellow-panelists
Thomas Cochran and Robert S. Norris), June 19, Ronald Reagan Building and International
Trade Center, Washinton, DC.
Issues Surrounding U.S. Congressional Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(conference organizer and participant) held at the Peace Studies Program, Cornell University,
Ithaca, NY, October 11-13, 1996.
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW G. MCKINZIE Civ. No. C-03-3926 SBA 11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Fissile Material Stocks and National Security: an Examination of Current and Potential Future
Policies of the United States, presented at the Eighth Annual Summer Symposium on Science
and World Affairs, Beijing, China (23-21 July, 1996).
Discussant (Climate Models), Simulating Knowledge: Cultural Analysis of Computer Modeling
in the Life Sciences, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY (19-21 April, 1996)
Security Aspects of the Future of Global Energy Resources, given at the Seventh
International Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs, Kiev, Ukraine (September 16-
25, 1995).
Cross sections for transitions of the _L>0 in the reactions 27Al, 13C(n,p) at Tn=198 MeV,
Bulletin of the American Physical Society 39, 1008 (1994).
The (n,p) Reaction on 27Al and 13C at 198 MeV, Bull. Am. Phys. Soc. 38, 1830 (1993).
Interference Effects in Non-Analog Pion DCX, Bull. Am. Phys. Soc. 38, 1816 (1993).
Inelastic pion scattering from 27Al, 28Si, Bull. Am. Phys. Soc. 37, 1303 (1992).
